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COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

PIPE SPECIALTY, INC.,
(A Utah Corporation)

*
*
*
*
*

Petitioner/
VS.

*
*

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH# and SALVADORE MONTOYA/

*
*

Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH
APPELLATE CASE NO: 930353-CA
PRIORITY NO. 7

*

PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (a) , Utah Code Ann. §35-1-86 and
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (1) grant the Utah

Court of Appeals

jurisdiction over Pipe Specialty/s Petition For Review.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

In light of Pipe Specialty7s untimely Motion For Review to

the Commission, does the Court have jurisdiction to consider the
merits of Pipe Specialty's Petition For Review?
plenary

authority

over

this

purely

legal

The Court has

issue.

Silva

v.

Department of Employment Security, 786 P. 2d 246, 247 (Utah App.
1990).

1

2.

Did the Commission err in denying Pipe Specialty's request

for relief from default?

Through the interplay of Utah Code Ann.

63-46b-ll(3) (c) and Rules 55(c) and 60(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Commission is granted discretion to determine
whether

a

party's

default

should

be

set

aside.

Such

a

determination should therefore be reviewed under a "reasonableness
and rationality"
16(4)(h)(i).

standard pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-

King v. Industrial Commission, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah

App. 1993).
3.

Does the record support the ALJ and Commission's award of

medical expenses and compensation to Mr. Montoya. The Commission's
determinations of fact are reviewed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §6346b-16(4)(g) under the "substantial evidence" standard.

King v.

Industrial. Commission, Ibid.

APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF STATUTE AND RULE
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. S35-1-45 (1988)
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured
and the dependents of each such employee who is killed,
by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid
compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury
or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and
hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death,
such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this
chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment
of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines,
and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on the
employee.

2

Utah Code Ann. 535-1-81
(1) In addition to the compensation provided for in
this chapter the employer or the insurance carrier shall
pay a reasonable sum for medical, nurse, and hospital
services, for medicines, and for artificial means,
appliances, and prostheses necessary to treat the injured
employee.
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-ll

(1993)

(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default
against a party if:
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding
fails to participate in the adjudicative proceeding;
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding
fails to attend or participate in a properly scheduled
hearing after receiving proper notice; or
(c) a respondent
in a formal
adjudicative
proceeding fails to file a response under Section
63-46b-6.
(2) An order of default shall include a statement of the
grounds for default and shall be mailed to all parties.
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the agency
set aside the default order, and any order in the
adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent to the default
order, by following the procedures outlined in the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any
subsequent order shall be made to the presiding officer.
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review under
Section 63-46b-12, or reconsideration under Section
63-46b-13, only on the decision of the presiding officer
on the motion to set aside the default.
(4) (a)
In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the
agency, or in an adjudicative proceeding begun by a party
that has other parties besides the party in default, the
presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of
default, conduct any further proceedings necessary to
complete the adjudicative
proceeding without
the
participation of the party in default and shall determine
all issues in the adjudicative proceeding, including
those affecting the defaulting party.
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no
parties other than the agency and the party in default,
the presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of
default, dismiss the proceeding.
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-12(1)(a)

(1993)

(1) (a)
If a statute or the agency's rules permit
parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review of
3

an order by the agency or by a superior agency, the
aggrieved party may file a written request for review
within 3 0 days after the issuance of the order with the
person or entity designated for that purpose by the
statute or rule.
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-14(2)
(2)
A party may seek judicial review only after
exhausting all administrative remedies available, except
that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter or any
other statute states that exhaustion is not required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial
review of the requirement to exhaust any or all
administrative remedies if:
(i) the
administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in
irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit
derived from requiring exhaustion.
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-16(4)

(1993)

(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on
its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction
conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure
or decision-making process, or has failed to follow
prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body or were
subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination
of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the
agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice,
4

unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving
facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational
basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
RULES
Rule 55(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(c) For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry
of default and, if a judgment by default has been
entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with
Rule 60(b).
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(b) On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause,
the summons in an action has not been personally served
upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 months
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court
to entertain an independent action to relieve a party
from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a
judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion
as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
Workers' Compensation Rules—Utah Administrative Code R568-1-4.E.
When an employer or insurance carrier fails to file an
answer within the 30 days provided above, the Commission
5

may enter a default against such employer or insurance
carrier. The Commission may then set the matter for
hearing, take evidence bearing on the claim, and enter an
Order based on the evidence presented. Such defaults may
be set aside by following the procedure outlined in the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Said default shall apply
to the defendant employer or insurance carrier and shall
not be construed to deprive the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund of any appropriate
defenses.
NATURE OF THE CASE, PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
This matter is before the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
Pipe Specialty's Petition For Review of the Industrial Commission
of Utah's final Order awarding workers' compensation benefits to
Salvador Montoya.
On October 1, 1991, Mr. Montoya was injured in an industrial
accident while employed by Pipe Specialty. (R. 0001)

Mr. Montoya

incurred medical expenses of $935.25 for treatment of the injury.
(R. 00082 to 00092)

Also because of the injury, he was unable to

work from October 1, 1991 until January 3, 1992.

(R. 00092)

On October 22, 1991, Mr. Montoya filed an Application For
Hearing under Utah's Workers' Compensation Act (Utah Code Ann. §3 51 et seq.) seeking a determination that Pipe Specialty was liable
for payment

of his medical

expenses

and

compensation arising from the accident.

temporary

disability

(R. 00001)

On January 30, 1992, the Commission's Adjudication Division
notified

Pipe

Specialty

in writing

Montoya's Application For Hearing.

that

(R.

it had

00006)

received

Mr.

The Adjudication

Division enclosed a copy of Mr. Montoya's Application For Hearing
with its letter and instructed Pipe Specialty as follows:
6

You must file with the Commission a written Answer to
said Application within thirty (3 0) days from the date of
this letter. . . . Failure to file an Answer within
thirty (30) days may result in an entry of your default
and the Commission will proceed without further notice to
you to enter an Order disposing of the Application.
The foregoing notice was mailed to Pipe Specialty at 4425 West
12600 South, Riverton, Utah

84065.

(R. 00008)

received the notice but did not file an Answer.

Pipe Specialty
(R. 00060-61)

On March 20, 1992, the ALJ entered Pipe Specialty's default.
(R.

00010)

A copy of the Default Order was mailed to Pipe

Specialty that same day, at its correct address of record.

(R.

00011)
The ALJ proceeded to adjudicate Mr. Montoya's claim and issue
his Order awarding medical expenses, temporary compensation
attorney's

fees to Mr. Montoya.

(R. 000200)

The Order

and
also

contained the following provision regarding appeal rights:
. . . Any Motion for Review of the foregoing shall be
filed in writing within thirty (3 0) days of the date
hereof, . . . and unless so filed, this Order shall be
final and not subject to review or appeal.
The Order was mailed to Pipe Specialty at its correct address of
record on October 19, 1993.

(R.00020 to R.00023)

On November 19, 1992, Pipe Specialty's attorney filed a Motion
For Review with the Commission.

(R.00033)

The Motion For Review

asked the Commission to set aside the default entered against Pipe
Specialty, to reopen Mr. Montoya's workers' compensation claim and
remand the claim to the ALJ to allow Pipe Specialty to contest the
claim.

(R. 00033)

As a basis for setting aside Pipe Specialty's

default, the Motion For Review alleged that Mr. Montoya had told
7

officers of Pipe Specialty that he did not intend to pursue his
workers' compensation claim, and for that reason Pipe Specialty had
not filed an Answer. Pipe Specialty filed no supporting affidavits
or other evidence in support of its Motion For Review. (R.00033 to
00034.)
On January 6, 1993, the Commission denied Pipe Specialty's
Motion For Review.
mailed

directly

(R.00042)

(R.00039, 00041)

to

Pipe

Specialty

The Commission's Order was
instead

of

its

On April 12, 1993, Pipe Specialty's attorney filed a

Request for Reconsideration with the Commission.
00045)

attorney.

(R.00044 and

The Commission took no action on the Request, which was

therefore deemed denied on May 3, 1993.

(R.00052)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because Pipe Specialty's Motion For Review was filed beyond
the

time

limit

established

by

Section

63-46b-12(l)

of

Utah's

Administrative Procedures Act, the Commission had no jurisdiction
to consider the Motion.

Consequently, Pipe Specialty lost its

right to any further administrative or judicial review.

Although

the Commission raises this issue for the first time in this brief,
such issues of jurisdiction may be raised at any time in the
proceeding.
If, despite Pipe Specialty's untimely Motion For Review,

the

Court concludes that it has jurisdiction in this matter, the Court
should

find

that

the

Commission's

refusal

to

set

aside

Pipe

Specialty's default was reasonable and rational, for the following
reasons:

First, Pipe Specialty failed to follow the procedure for
8

seeking relief from default that is established by Utah Code Anno.
§63-46b-ll(3) (c), in conjunction with Rules 55(c) and 60(b), Utah
Rules

of

Civil

Procedure.

Second,

Pipe

Specialty

failed

to

establish sufficient cause to set aside its default.
Finally, the evidence of record supports the ALJ's decision,
as affirmed by the Commission, that Mr. Montoya is entitled to
medical expenses and temporary disability compensation.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
BECAUSE PIPE SPECIALTY'S MOTION FOR REVIEW TO THE
COMMISSION WAS UNTIMELY, THE COMMISSION AND THIS COURT
HAVE NO JURISDICTION IN THIS MATTER.
Mr. Montoya's claim for workers' compensation benefits and
Pipe

Specialty's

defenses

to

that

claim

are

subject

to

the

requirements of Utah's Administrative Procedures Act, (Utah Code
Ann. §63-46b-l et seq., "UAPA" hereafter.)
Section 63-46b-12(1)(a) of UAPA allows a party aggrieved by
an agency order 30 days to either file a request for review, or
obtain an extension of the 3 0 day period by showing good cause for
the extension.

Maverik v. Industrial Commission, 860 P. 2d 944

(Utah App. 1993).
jurisdictional.

The filing requirement of §63-46b-12(1)(a) is
The Commission has no authority to consider an

untimely motion for review.
In this

Maverik, ibid.

case, the ALJ's

decision

therefore issued on October 19, 1991.
842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992).

was

signed,

dated

and

Dusty's v. Tax Commission,

Pipe Specialty filed its Motion For

9

Review on November 19, 1991, 31 days later, by hand delivery to the
Commission.
Because Pipe Specialty's Motion For Review was filed beyond
the

30

day

period

allowed

by

§63-46b-12 (1) (a)

of

UAPA,

the

Commission lacked jurisdiction to consider the Motion's merits.
Maverik v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d at 950.
The Commission's Order erred in finding that Pipe Specialty's
Motion For Review had been timely filed.

Because of that error,

the Commission dismissed the Motion on its merits, rather than for
lack of jurisdiction.

Despite the Commission's failure to note its

lack of jurisdiction, the jurisdictional defect may be raised at
any stage in the proceeding, and cannot be waived by the parties or
the Court.

Silva v. Department of Employment Security, 786 P. 2d

246, 247 (Utah App. 1990).
Not only did Pipe Specialty's untimely Motion For Review
deprive the Commission of jurisdiction, it likewise deprives this
Court of jurisdiction.

This is so because by failing to file a

timely Motion For Review with the Commission, Pipe Specialty failed
to

exhaust

its

administrative

remedies.

Exhaustion

of

administrative remedies is required as a prerequisite to judicial
review.

Section 63-46b-14(2) of UAPA provides:

"A party may seek

judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies;
(subject
Specialty's
therefore

failure

deprives

to
to
the

exceptions
exhaust
Court

of

not material
its

here)."

administrative

subject

matter

remedies

jurisdiction.

Maverick v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d at 547, 548.
10

Pipe

In summary, because Pipe Specialty failed to file a timely
Motion For Review, the ALJ's Order became final on November 18,
1991.

After that date, the Order was no longer subject to review

by the Commission, or appellate review by this Court.
POINT TWO
THE COMMISSION'S REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE PIPE SPECIALTY'S
DEFAULT WAS REASONABLE AND RATIONAL AND SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
Even if the Court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of
Pipe Specialty's Petition For Review, the Court should affirm the
Commission's rejection of Pipe Specialty's request for relief from
default.
As an initial point, Pipe Specialty did not comply with the
procedure established by law and rule for requesting relief from
default.

Section 63-46b-ll((3)(c) of UAPA provides:

"A motion to

set aside a default and any subsequent order shall be made to the
presiding officer." (Emphasis added.)
UAPA's requirement that requests for relief from default be
presented to the presiding officer was a considered decision of the
drafters of UAPA:
The intent of Section 4 6b-ll(3) is that the presiding
officer initially decides whether a default should be set
aside . . . .
(Comments of the Utah Administrative Law
Advisory Committee on the Drafting and Interpretation of
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Code Co. Law
Publishers, 1988.)
The requirement that the presiding officer decide whether
relief

from

officer's

default

knowledge

is

warranted

of

the

case.

in

light
In

of

keeping

the

presiding

with

UAPA's

requirement that the presiding officer decide whether relief from
11

default

is proper, Section 63-46b-ll(3)(c)

of UAPA

limits the

Commission's involvement to a purely review function:
A defaulted party may seek agency review under Section
63-46b-12, or reconsideration under Section 63-46b-13,
only on the decision of the presiding officer on the
motion to set aside the default.
If

Pipe

Specialties

had

complied

with

the

foregoing

requirement of UAPA, it would have had the opportunity to present
all its evidence and argument in support of relief from defaultThe ALJ's ruling could then have been reviewed by the Commission
with the benefit of a complete record.
Pipe Specialties7 failure to follow the foregoing procedure
has limited the evidence which is now available not just from Pipe
Specialties, but also from Mr. Montoya. Having chosen to frame the
default

issue

consequences

in this way, Pipe
of

its choice.

Specialty

must

The Commission's

abide

denial

by
of

the
Pipe

Specialty's request for relief from default should be affirmed.
Aside from Pipe Specialty's failure to follow procedures for
seeking relief from default, Pipe Specialty has also failed to
provide evidence that it is entitled to relief from default.
Under §11(3) of UAPA, default may be set aside under the
provisions of Rules 55(c) and 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Taken

together,

Rules

55(c)

and

Rule

60(b),

as

pertinent to this case, allow relief from default for mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party.
Pipe Specialty argues that an alleged misrepresentation by Mr.
Montoya

caused

it

to

refrain

from
12

filing

its Answer

to Mr.

Montoya , s Application For Hearing.
matter

contains

no competent

misrepresentation.

However, the record in this

evidence whatsoever

of any

such

The alleged misrepresentation was raised for

the first time in Pipe Specialty's Motion For Review, but with no
supporting evidence. Later, after this matter was before the Court
and as part of the briefing, Pipe Specialty attempted to submit an
affidavit regarding the alleged misrepresentation.
There are ways to place evidence

of an opposing

party's

misconduct into the record. The evidence could have been presented
to the presiding officer if Pipe Specialty had followed proper
procedure.

In that case, Mr. Montoya would have had an opportunity

to respond.

Even at the late date of the these proceedings, Pipe

Specialty could have attempted to augment the record before the
Court.

Whether such an effort would have been successful

problematic.

is

Olson v. Park-Craiq-Olson, Inc., 815 P. 2d 1356, 1359

(Utah App. 1991).

However, because Pipe Specialties has taken

neither of the foregoing steps, its proffered affidavit must be
disregarded by the Court.

Olson v. Park-Craiq-Olson, Inc., ibid.

Absent that affidavit, there is no evidence to support allegations
of misrepresentation or misconduct by Mr. Montoya.
Pipe Specialty also contends that it did not receive notice
that default had been entered against it.

The Commission has

addressed this point in its Order Denying Motion For Review and has
simply found it unworthy of belief.

The record establishes that

all documents, including the Default Order, were mailed to the
proper address.

No documents were returned to the Commission as
13

undelivered.

Pipe

Specialty

concedes

documents at the given address.

that

it

received

some

Based on the foregoing, the

evidence supports the Commission's conclusion that Pipe Specialty
received all required notices and orders and had ample opportunity
to protect its interests in this matter.
In summary, Pipe Specialty failed to properly request relief
from default in this matter and has failed to properly submit any
competent

evidence

in support of

its request

for relief

from

default.

The Commission's decision affirming the ALJ's decision

and refusing to set aside Pipe Specialty's default is reasonable
and rational and supported by the available evidence properly
before this Court.

POINT III
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S AWARD OF MEDICAL
EXPENSES AND TEMPORARY DISABILITY COMPENSATION TO MR.
MONTOYA.
The initial decision of the ALJ, as later affirmed by the
Commission, awarded temporary total disability benefits and medical
expenses to Mr. Montoya.

Pipe Specialty argues that the evidence

before the ALJ and Commission is insufficient to support such an
award.
A party attacking the Commission's findings of fact on appeal
must marshall all the evidence available in the record, including
the

evidence

evidence

that

that

supports

supports

the

the party's

attack,

Commission's

Industrial Commission of Utah, 850 P.2d
14

but

decision.

1281

also
King

any
v.

(Utah App. 1993).

Pipe Specialty has failed to comply with this requirements of
marshalling the evidence.
When

the

available

evidence

supports the Commission's decision.

is

examined,

it

uniformly

The facts of Mr. Montoya's

employment by Pipe Specialty, the nature of his accident and the
resulting injury, the amount of his medical expenses and the period
of his inability to work are all substantiated in the record.

The

Commission is unaware of any contrary evidence that contradicts any
part of the Commission's Order.

The Commission's findings are,

therefore, clearly supported by substantial evidence and should be
affirmed.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Commission contends that Pipe Specialty's
Petition For Review should be dismissed, either on jurisdictional
grounds or on its merits.
DATED this 28th day of March, 1994.

By
Alan Hennebold, General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused 2 true and correct copies of
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH to be served upon
Petitioner Pipe Specialty

Inc. by causing to be placed

in an

envelope addressed to the following:
James J. Lund
Attorney at Law
23 04 S. Berkeley Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
and said envelope was then deposited, sealed, with first class
postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake
City, Utah, on the 28th day of March, 1994.

Alan Hennebold
General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah
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J
Form 0 0 1 Revised 3 / 9 1

i

:J

W<Lf

Industrial C o m m i s s i o n of Utah
Industrial A c c i d e n t s Division
1 6 0 East 3 0 0 S o u t h - r.O. Box 5 1 0 2 5 0
S.L.C., UT 8 4 1 5 1 - 0 2 5 0
NOTE: PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT IN BLACK INK

The Industrial Commission h a s
the following d o c u m e n t s on file:
Medical
•
Employer Report
D
First Payment Report
D
Copies of the above d o c u m e n t s
will be provided u p o n request

Applicant (Employee)

Maiden Name a n d / o r Other Name(s) Used

i L£JL

APPLICATION FOR HEARING

Employer

*

*

f^^OQ

Employer's Street Address

9 ^

*

Employer's I n s u r a n c e Carrier
APPLICANT ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING UNDER TITLE 3 5 :
1. I s u s t a i n e d a n injury by accident arising out of a n d in the c o u r s e of employment with Defendant (employer)
on t h e

/

day of

O CfTp fi £, £

, 19 9 / , at t h e following location: (Give name & complete

address or nearestjunction,
mile marker, etc.) OS H ^ - / ft/ u J ^ s T T'O JjFVd AMO f A \\
A c r o s s /^MC jpi±(\vT
'
-.
"T7~r > '
2. The accident occurred a s follows: (Describe accident and resulting injuries (Bodypart(s) injured) £/ Tf t A) <i 7 O x" £ C
- T h ^ o p c &hH
^pAA/r o,- 6.1 T O
from
di
3.*. The injury c a u s e d temporary
temporary total disability

/Q/,3

/

?/
Date returned

Date first off
4.

>n a s follows:
folio
I have received compensation
(Indicate the last paid amounts
the last payment

date.)_

you received (weekly or monthly) and

M 0 ,0<*L

5. This Claim is filed b e c a u s e : (Please mark an X in the appropriate
space(s))
A. X
Unpaid Medical E x p e n s e s
F.
P e r m a n e n t Total Compensation
B.
Recommended Medical Care
G.
Travel Expenses
C.
Temporary Total Compensation
H.
Interest
D.
Temporary Partial Compensation
I. y
Other (specify) J M A) CT~ <j <*JT* ^ *l
P^/ft
f^*>r
/HyT~
T V ^ ^ o^t~ ^ £ / L 7 < E.
P e r m a n e n t Partial Compensation
7 TV
IN ADDITION, THE CLAIMANT ALLEGES: (Please fill in or mark appropriate
blank)
My date of birth is

(& / Q~/ C 0

. At the time of injury my wage w a s $

week; m o n t h ; or other (if other, specify method of payment)
I fA.
Date

was /

w a s not married a n d h a d

/o /j a / 5 /

/

i t . ^

a n d I w a s working

h o u r s per week.

children u n d e r age 18 dependent on me for support.
Printed Name of Applicant

Printed Name of Attorney

^Signature of Applicant

Signature of Attorney

Street Address of Applicant

Street Address & Office # of Attorney

City / S t a t e / Zip of Applicant

City / State / Zip

/

93(oa /-/coy r$tf

LAS a o c ^

soffk

A) CA

tt^of

/

Telephone
Applicant's Telephone
Social Security #
UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS WILL BE RETURNED
SIGNATURES CERTIFY READING OF INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE OF T H ^ f
P*M\
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
Stephen M Hadle\
Chairman

160 East 300 South
Norman H Bangerter
Governor
Timothy C Allen
Presiding Administrative Law Judge

PO

Box 510250

Thomas R CarUon
Commi^iont-

Salt Lake City Utah 84151 0250
( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 0 6800

January 30, 1992

(801) 530 6804 (Fax)

Dixie L Mm^on
Commi sioncr

CERTIFIED MAIL - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
KIM MARGETTS
PIPE SPECIALTY INC
4425 WEST 12600 SOUTH
RIVERTON UT 84065
Re:
Inj:
Emp:

Salvador D Montoya
10-01-91
Pipe Specialty
(UNINSURED)

Gentlemen:
We are enclosing a copy of the above named employee's
Application for Hearing which has been filed with the Commission.
You must file with the Commission a written Answer to said
Application within thirty (3 0) days from the date of this letter.
Said Answer may be in letter form, but should either admit or deny
liability for the claim.
It should either admit, deny, or
specifically respond to every paragraph of the application form.
You must set forth any affirmative defenses you may have or you may
be precluded from raising such defenses at any hearing on the
claim.
Failure to file an Answer within thirty (30) days may
result in an entry of your default and the Commission will proceed
without further notice to you to enter an Order disposing of the
Application.
BY DIRECTION:
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By
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o
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Q.
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fay 28 South, Las Cruces
S, Riverton

>

UT 84065

insured Employers Fund
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No.

SALVADOR D MONTOYA,

91001181

*
*

Applicant,

*
*

V.

.

•

*

DEFAULT ORDER

*

PIPE SPECIALTY
(UNINSURED),

*
*
*

Defendants.

*
*

An Application for Hearing having been filed with the
Commission in this case on October 24, 1991; and the Commission
having transmitted a copy of said Application to the defendants,
Pipe Specialty, on January 30, 1992, advising defendants to file an
Answer to said Application within thirty (30) days from date of
mailing of said Application or suffer default to enter, and have
the Commission proceed without further notice to said defendant;
and defendants having failed to file an Answer, said default is
hereby entered this 2 0 :k(< AA,^.f(OtAy\^f(l
(Qq ^

r

OA
'

&^>^

Donald L George
Administrative Law Judge

Certified this
March 1992.

20th

ATTEST:

/ s / Patricia Ashby
P a t r i c i a Ashby
Commission S e c r e t a r y

day of

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached
DEFAULT ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid on

Marrh ?03 1QQ?

to the following persons at the following addresses:
Salvador D Montoya, 43 62 Highway 28 South, Las Cruces
88005
Pipe Specialty Inc, 4425 W 12600 S, Riverton

UT

84065

Joyce Sewell, Administrator, Uninsured Employers Fund
Cynthia A Anderson, Atty, Uninsured Employers Fund

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Marjorie Mele
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 91-1181
SALVADOR D. MONTOYA,
Applicant,
vs.

*
*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

*

PIPE SPECIALTIES, INC,
(uninsured).

*
*

Judge Donald L. George

*

Defendant.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Donald
L. George, one of the Administrative Law Judges of the Industrial
Commission of Utah on October 15, 1992 on the application of
Salvador Montoya for an award of temporary total compensation and
payment of medical expenses incurred as the result of an industrial accident. The applicant was present by telephone from his
home in New Mexico. The default of the defendant, Pipe Specialties, Inc., was issued on March 20, 1992 for failure to respond
to the application within the time required by the rules of the
Industrial Commission of Utah. The Uninsured Employers' Fund
appeared through its counsel, Thomas C. Sturdy. The applicant
testified on his behalf and the medical records pertinent to Mr.
Montoya's injuries were admitted in evidence. Based upon that
testimony and evidence, the Industrial Commission of Utah now
makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
On October 1, 1991, while pursuing the business of his
employer, defendant JPipe Specialties, Inc., a Utah corporation,
the applicant suffered an industrial accident when a jig holding
a large section of pipe broke and dropped the pipe on Mr.
Montoya 7 s foot, fracturing the proximal phalanx of the left great
toe. The accident occurred near Pocatello, Idaho. Mr. Montoya
had worked for Pipe Specialties within the State of Utah within
the previous six months.
The Bannock Memorial Medical Center, Pocatello, Idaho, and
Alan C. Davis, M.D., Las Cruces, New Mexico, treated Mr.
Montoya / s injury. The medical bills are: $432.25 owing to the
Bannock Regional Medical Center and $503.00 owing to Dr. Davis.
At the time of the accident, Mr. Montoya was working an
average of 55 hours per week and earning $11.00 per hour. He was
married and had one child who was dependent on him for support.
Mr. Montoya was totally disabled from the day of the acci-
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dent until Dr. Davis released him to return to work on January 3,
1992.
Pipe Specialties, Inc. had no worker's compensation insurance at the time of Mr. Montoya's accident.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The applicant sustained a compensable industrial accident on
October 1, 1992, while employed by defendant Pipe Specialties,
Inc., when a large section of pipe dropped on his foot and
fractured the proximal phalanx of the left great toe.
The defendant is liable for Applicant's medical expenses
reasonably related to the industrial injury.
The applicant is entitled to temporary total disability
compensation benefits for the period from October 2, 1991 to
January 3, 1992 when he was released to return to work by his
treating physician.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Pipe Specialties, Inc. shall pay
all medical expenses incurred by the applicant as the result of
the industrial accident including, but not limited to, $432.25
owing to the Bannock Regional Medical Center, and $503.00 owing
to Dr. Alan C. Davis.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Pipe Specialties, Inc.,
pay to Salvador Montoya temporary total compensation at the rate
of $378.00 per week for 13.4286 weeks for a total of $5,706.01
for temporary total disability from October 2, 1991 through
January 3, 1992. These benefits are accrued and shall be paid in
a lump sum with interest of 8% per annum commencing January 3,
1992.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the applicant shall be entitled
to recover all attorneys fees and costs incurred in collecting
this award from Pipe Specialties, Inc., pursuant to UCA §35-1-59.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Pipe Specialties, Inc.,
becomes or is insolvent, appoints or has appointed a receiver, or
otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or
other security to pay the amounts required to be paid by this
Order, the compensation and benefits shall be paid by the Uninsured Employers' Fund in accordance with the Medical and Surgical
Fee Schedule of the Commission. In the event of payment by the
Uninsured Employers' Fund, it shall be subrogated to all of the
rights of the applicant to collect the sums due and owing by Pipe
Specialties, Inc., pursuant to UCA §35-1-107.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of

00321

the date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and
not subject to review or appeal.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

JQ

O ^5(J>

Donald L. George
Administrative Law Judge
Certified by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
/?t£s

day of October, 1992.

ATTEST:

^

y

L yc-r.^

^y

ft

.yhiML,

Patricia 0. Ashb(V
Commission Secretary

//
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING^
I certify that on the / ^ V ^ a v of / / r />:; Z^_.-, , :-1992, I
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing findings of fact,
conclusions of law and order by depositing the same in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Salvador D. Montoya
4 3 62 Highway 28 South
Las Cruces, NM 84065
Pipe Specialties, Inc.
4425 West 12600 South
Riverton, UT 84 065
Joyce A, Sewell, Administrator
Uninsured Employers' Fund
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 146612
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6612
Thomas C. Sturdy
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 146612
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6612
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
f

f

t

June Harrisbh, Paralegal -J
Adjudication Division
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MOTION FOR REVIEW
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James J. Lund 5751
Attorney for Defendant
10 West 100 South #710
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 575-8311

'ir\P :
^ )\?
ij I Vl
I'M ! MOV ; f wop
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION O F UTAH

Salvador D. Montoya
Apphcant

Pipe Specialties, Inc.,
Defendant

MOTION FOR REVIEW

Judge Donald George

Defendant moves the Commission, pursuant to Commission Rules and Utah Code
Ann. Section 35-1-82.52 (1988 Repl. Vol
) to review its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order entered on the 19th day of October 1992. The basis for Defendant's
motion for Review is as follows:
1.

Apphcant is currently and has been in the employ of Defendant subsequent
to the alleged accident date.

2.

While in the employ of Defendant, Apphcant told Defendant he no longer
wished to pursue a claim against Defendant.

3.

Based on such representations, Defendant did not respond, to Claimant's
Application, by filing on answer.

4.

Further, Defendant received Notice of Cancellation of Hearing from the
Commission dated April 2, 1992.

5.

Thereafter, Defendant received no further notice from either the Commission
or Apphcant that any action was still pending against it.

6.

Under such understanding Defendant did not apprise the undersigned of any
action pending.
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH
Page Two
7,

The undersigned has been active in representing Defendant in various legal
matters including a separate matter before the Commission involving Mr.
Lester Hunt as applicant.

8.

As counsel for Defendant the undersigned has never received any notice
concerning Applicant's application.

Based on the foregoing Defendant seeks a Hearing and Review on the merits of AppKcant's
Application and a reasonable and fair opportunity to consider the evidence put forth by
Applicant in Support of the award entered by way at Order by the Commission on October
19, 1992.

DATED this 19th day of November, 1992

/Japfes J. Lun^K
^Attorney
torney for De
Defendant
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ADDENDUM
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case Number 91001181
Salvador D. Montoya,

/A

w

Applicant,
^c ^ r,y
^_
J^^-YA^
>l0'-\
Pipe Specialties, Inc.
(uninsured),

vs.

*
*
*
*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR
REVIEW

*

Respondent.

*

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah ("commission11) issues this
order pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-78 and Section
63-46b-12.
On November 19, 1992, Pipe Specialties, Inc. ("respondent")
timely filed a motion for review of the Findings of Fact
Conclusions of Law and Order entered by an administrative law judge
("ALJ") of the commission in the above captioned matter on October
19, 1992.
The respondent requests that the commission grant a hearing
and review the merits of the applicant/s claim. The respondent's
request is based upon its claim that it received no notice of the
pending action following the Notice of Cancellation of Hearing
dated April 2, 1992.
Review of the record in this matter shows that the respondent
received notice of the following: (1) Application for Hearing by
certified letter dated January 30, 1992; (2) Notice of Hearing
dated March 19, 1992; (3) Default Order for failure of respondents
to file an answer to the application for hearing dated March 20,
1992; (4) Interrogatories to Applicant dated March 31, 1992; (5)
Notice of Cancellation of Hearing dated April 2, 1992; (6) Notice
of Hearing on October 16, 1992 dated July 20, 1992; (7) Findings of
Fact Conclusions of Law and Order dated October 19, 1992; (8)
Abstract of Award dated October 19, 1992; (9) Supplemental Order
Awarding Attorneys Fees dated November 4, 1992; and (10) Abstract
of Award dated November 4, 1992.
The file contains no notice that Mr. Lund was representing the
respondent in this matter. All notices described above were mailed
to the respondent at its address in Riverton, Utah and none were
returned.
It is unreasonable for the respondent to assert that
notice should have been sent to his attorney when no notice of
representation had been filed with the commission. We believe that
the respondent had ample notice and opportunity to appear or file
pleadings in this matter.
The respondent further claims that the applicant made
representations that he no longer wished to pursue his claim
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Salvador D. Montoya
Order
Page two
against the respondent and that the applicant's representation
caused the respondent not to file an answer to the application for
a hearing. It appears, then that the respondent is attempting to
articulate an estoppel argument in support of granting a new
hearing.
A party claiming an estoppel cannot rely on representations or
acts if they are contrary to his own knowledge of the truth or if
he had the means by which with reasonable diligence he could
ascertain the true situation. Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39,
465 P.2d 356 (1970); see also Cook v. Cook, 110 Utah 406, 174 P.2d
434 (1946) . Furthermore, a determination of the issue of estoppel
is not dependent on the subjective state of mind of the person
claiming he was misled, but rather is to be based on an objective
test, i.e., what would a reasonable person conclude under the
circumstances. Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, Utah, 570 P. 2d 690
(1977); Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417
(1973) .
The Industrial Commission has no statutory authority to
provide equitable remedies 1 , however, even if we had such
authority we would not find in favor of respondent under these
circumstances. Applying a reasonable person standard, we find that
a new hearing is not warranted in this case.
The respondent
received notice of all pleadings and hearings in this matter and
chose to ignore them in deference to the alleged misrepresentations
of the applicant. We believe that a reasonable person would make
further inquiry with the commission or his attorney if he received
notices regarding a matter he believed had been resolved.
Therefore,
the
respondent's
reliance
on
the
alleged
misrepresentations of the applicant was unreasonable.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the Order of the administrative law
judge dated November 19, 1992 is hereby affirmed.

1

"[T]he Industrial Commission remains a statutorily-created
agency, not a court of equity. As such, the Industrial Commission
has only those powers expressly or impliedly granted to it by the
legislature." Bevans v. Industrial Commission, 790 P.2d 573, 576
(1990); Utah Copper Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 118, 193 P.
24, 26 (1920).
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Salvador D. Montoya
Order
Page three
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the
Utah Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date of the Order,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86,
and 63-46b-16, and Bonded Bicycle Couriers v. Dept. of Employment
Security, Case No. 920621-CA (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1992).
The
requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a transcript of
the hearing for appeals purposes.

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

Commissioner
Certified this &tZ
AT3
Patricia O. Ashby/
Commission Secretary

day of/fr^^A-^-^

1993.

^
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the '
of January, 1993, the
attached ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of Salvador
Montoya was mailed, postage pre-paid to the following persons at
the following addresses:
Salvador Montoya
4362 Highway 28 So
Las Cruces, NM 84065
Pipe Specialties, Inc
4425 W 12600 S
Riverton UT 84065
Joyce Sewell, Administrator
UEF
Thomas C, Sturdy, Atty
UEF
Judge Donald L. George

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

ne S. Harrison, Paralegal
judication Division
/jsh
Cert\Montoya
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ADDENDUM
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

JAMES J. LUND #5751
Suite 710 Crandall Building
10 west 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
Telephone: (801) 575-8311
Facsimile: (801) 575-8340
Attorney for Defendant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
ADJUDICATION DIVISION

SALVADOR MONTOYA, an individual,
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Plaintiff
v.
:
PIPE SPECIALTY, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,

Case No.

;

Defendant.

:

Defendant, Pipe Specialty, by and through its counsel, James
J. Lund, hereby moves the Division to reconsider the Division's
Order denying review previously sought by Defendants Motion for
Review.

The basis for this Motion for Reconsideration is as

follows:
1. By Defendant's previously filed Motion for Review on or about
fJpi/r^far

f*f

of 1992, the Division was apprised of the

undersigned's representation of Defendant.

1
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2. The Division, through denying Defendant's Motion for Review,
failed to give notice to the undersigned because it. omitted
the undersigned's name and address to the mailing or service
certificate

that

accompanied

Qa^iUd^u (? /9#1
3. In

subsequent

the

Division's

Order

dated

denying the Defendant's Motion for Review.
communication

with

General

Counsel

for the

Industrial Commission, in March of 1993 the undersigned had
confirmed to him the fact that improper or inadequate notice
of the Division's Order denying the Defendant's Motion for
Review had been given.
4. Because of the inadequate and/or improper and untimely notice
Defendant's appeal rights from the Division's Order denying
the Defendant's Motion for Review were obviated.
5. The appeal time frame began running from the date of the
Division's Order or

/

^JZ^U^^Y

/??}

6. Defendant and its officers, being out of town on work was not
apprised of the Division's Order denying Defendant's Motion
for

Review

and

therefore

could

not

timely

notify

the

undersigned of any action by the Division.
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendant, by and through the
counsel of record, James J. Lund, hereby respectfully submits
this Motion for Reconsideration.
DATED this

£—

day of April, 1993.

fes J. Lu|
Attorney for Defendant

2
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